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Cultural Capital:   
Intellectual Traditions and the Liberal Arts 
 
Chris Prendergast 
Professor of Sociology 
Pantagraph Teacher of the Year Acceptance Speech 
4/13/05 
 
Thank you. Before I begin, I’d like to acknowledge two debts of a 
highly personal nature. The first is to my wife Susan, who has been 
my love and inspiration since graduate school days …. The second 
is to my first, and still unsurpassed teacher, my mother, Katherine. 
I would also like to acknowledge the person who will give the 
benediction later this morning, Jodie Daquilanea. Jodie is doing 
Honors Research on postmodern ethics under me this semester, 
and I learned a lot doing it. Thanks, Jodie. 
 
I am truly humbled to receive this award. I have long said that, if 
teaching excellence could be quantified, I’d be happy to earn a 
median rank on this faculty. If there is any justification for this 
award beyond seniority and service, it lies in my course, Sociology 
290:  The History of Social Thought, which earns GNED credit in 
the category of Intellectual Traditions. I taught The History of 
Social Thought twice a semester to 20-25 students since the new 
GNED program went into effect 7 years ago. Veterans of the 
course should appreciate some of the literary references this 
morning. 
 
Having listened to these acceptance speeches now for 19 years, 
I’ve noted that they typically contain three elements:  some 
biographical information about the speaker, a homily or moral 
lesson for the honors students who are being recognized today, and 
some acknowledgement of the larger purposes for which this 
university stands, its mission. I am going to spend a little longer 
than usual on the biographical component, partially because, being 
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shy and quiet, most students and even close friends know relatively 
little about me, but mainly because my teaching and scholarship 
dovetail so completely with the homily and mission components. 
My major purpose this morning is to discuss the contributions that 
courses in the Intellectual Traditions category make to the very 
idea of a liberal education today. My secondary purpose is to show 
how courses in theory and intellectual history empower students to 
become participating citizens in a world increasingly dependent on 
the discovery of new knowledge and methods of inquiry. In 
contemporary jargon, they provide students with ‘cultural capital’ 
that they can apply throughout their professional lives. Hence the 
title of my talk, “Cultural Capital:  Intellectual Traditions and the 
Liberal Arts.” 
 
Let me start the biographical part with an episode from my early 
years that made an indelible impression on me. It involves my 
mother, Katherine. We are sitting in the kitchen in our brownstone 
at 115 St. Mark’s Avenue, in Brooklyn, NY, a little more than a 
half a block from where Sixth Avenue terminates at Flatbush 
Avenue, and perhaps three quarters of a mile from St. Augustine’s 
Grammar School, in what is known as the Park Slope 
neighborhood of Brooklyn. It might have been the second or third 
grade, and I’ve just been given the Catechism to memorize. The 
Catholic Catechism is organized in question and answer form, and 
you get high marks for reciting the answers just as they are written 
out. Mom is helping me with this, but she can’t resist the urge to 
explain to me how three persons comprise one God and the 
degrees of badness that make some sins venal and others mortal. 
This wasn’t skeptical questioning, just sense-making. She was 
doing what we all do along the way of mastering the concepts and 
propositions of an intellectual tradition—translating them into the 
familiar concepts and metaphors of the life-world, the common 
sense reality of everyday life. She was using her native intelligence 
to assimilate scholasticism into units of practical belief. At age 7 or 
8, I noticed the contrast between Mom’s sense-making, which I 
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duly admired then and even more so now, and the clerical 
rationalism of the nuns and priests. It says a lot about me that I 
preferred the rationalist version more.  
 
Second snapshot, 6 or 7 years later, now a Sophomore in high 
school. Catholic H. S., of course. But fatefully for me, the high 
school that shared a half-block off Sixth Avenue with my church 
and grammar school was designated a ‘diocesan high school,’ that 
is, it admitted boys—and boys alone—from all over Brooklyn. Not 
only was it highly competitive, it was ‘college prep,’ a distinction 
that escaped me at the time. Here I had the disturbing experience 
of feeling out of my league in every endeavor from cross-country 
track to French pronunciation. Perhaps for this reason, I was 
indifferent and unmotivated into my second year, and in the 
process of failing Geometry, which I would have to re-take during 
summer school. I recall one moment, a turning point of sorts, quite 
vividly. It occurred in English class, during a discussion of J. F. 
Powers’ novel, Morte D’Urban, which is a story about an 
ambitious priest who had strayed from the principles of his 
religious order. I had contributed very little to class discussion 
until the teacher posed a question about Father Urban’s motivation 
in the climatic scene in the novel. We had analyzed the novel 
enough that I suddenly ‘saw’ where that piece fit into an emerging, 
global interpretation. I remember the teacher seemed surprised to 
see my hand in the air, and surprised again by my answer. I had 
done nothing more than my mother had done 6 or 7 years earlier, 
used a rough-hewed intellect to make sense of a mystery. Everyone 
in this room has had the same experience. This is the moment, so 
exquisite in retrospect, when you feel enough confidence in 
yourself to believe that you might accept a bigger intellectual 
challenge in the future.  
 
Naturally, I took a few more literature classes—my favorite being 
a course on James Joyce in college—but it was social theory that 
provided the intellectual challenge that changed my life. Snapshot 
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three, Brooklyn College, Spring 1967, 8:00 AM class in 
sociological theory, Arlene Steinman sitting at the desk at the front 
of the room, one leg curled under her body, a large coffee and ash 
try in front of her, lecturing on Marx’s theory of alienation from 
The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, explaining 
the differences between externalization, objectification, and 
reification, citing Hegel’s Phenomenology and Feuerbach’s 
Essence of Christianity, and looking ahead to Durkheim’s concept 
of anomie and Weber’s iron cage of instrumental rationality. 
Completely enthralled. Best of all, we finished the semester with 
Berger and Luckmann’s Social Construction of Reality, then only 
available in hardback, Arlene being a graduate student of Peter 
Berger’s at the New School for Social Research, where Berger in 
turn had studied under Alfred Schutz, the philosopher and social 
theorist who a few years later would become my special field of 
expertise. The Social Construction of Reality is a highly synthetic 
work, and Arlene showed us how the whole tradition of 
sociological theory could be subsumed under a simple model of 
externalization, objectification, and internalization, the three 
processes through which every social institution is constructed, 
rationalized, made subjectively meaningful, and finally taken for 
granted as an objective facticity, as part of the furniture of the 
universe. 
 
I could continue in this mode for quite a while, but it is time to 
segue into the topic of intellectual traditions. My three snapshots 
seem to tell the same basic story three ways. Whether it is the 
Catechism, the interpretation of Morte D’Urban, or the history of 
social thought, I seem preoccupied with things fitting together into 
units of meaning and units of meaning into larger systems, 
particularly those with a synthetic structure. So it will come as no 
surprise when I tell you that my major preoccupations as a scholar 




I have always been attracted to the great system builders, not only 
in sociology, but in economics and philosophy as well. I have 
always wanted to know from whence came the premises of their 
systems and how they justified those premises epistemologically. 
That’s the problem of foundations. But I also wanted to know how 
intellectual systems support one another, influence one another, 
clash with one another, and either disappear or reticulate into new 
fields and subfields of knowledge. That’s the problem of the “unity 
of knowledge” when taken as an historical inquiry or the problem 
of the “unification of knowledge” when one promotes a positive 
program of theoretical, meta-theoretical, or even metaphysical 
synthesis.  
 
As I just indicated, one can approach these problems in at least two 
ways—historically or normatively. Most of my scholarship has 
been historical in nature. Where did the field called ‘social impact 
assessment’ come from? Not from the National Environmental 
Protection Act of 1969, but from Condorcet’s canal study of 1775. 
Where did Émile Durkheim get his concepts of ‘social 
morphology’ and ‘mechanical solidarity’? Not from his 
contemporary and rival Herbert Spencer, but from his teacher, 
Fustel de Coulanges. How did Alfred Schutz come to revise Max 
Weber’s concepts of social action, understanding, and the ideal 
type in the manner that he did? Not because he derived these 
solutions from Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of internal time-
consciousness, but because he needed both Husserl and Weber to 
shore up the foundations of the Austrian school of economics. The 
recurrent use of “not” in the previous sentences indicates one 
distinctive feature of the historical study of intellectual traditions, 
its capacity to surprise us by uncovering new contexts of 
interpretation, thus freeing us from a reigning interpretation that is 
inadequate in its simplicity.  
 
One can also approach problems of foundations and unification 
normatively. Here one proceeds as Schutz did with respect to 
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marginal utility theory, by proposing solutions to problems that the 
progenitors of the theory may not have recognized even existed. I 
started along this track two sabbaticals ago with the concepts of 
‘social structure’ and ‘structural explanation’ in sociology. Social 
structure should be understood as a phenomenon of levels, I argue, 
of which six can be discerned in liberal democratic societies. 
Moreover, if we adopt the six-level scheme, we can overcome the 
fruitless opposition between ‘structure’ and ‘action’ that prevailed 
in contemporary social theory since the 1960s:  We can have 




Let me now turn to the connection between the study of 
intellectual traditions and the liberal arts. I will only have time to 
rattle off a couple of connections, with inadequate set up and less 
justification. The most important point I wish to make is this:  
Liberal education is itself an intellectual tradition, which means 
that we can study its premises historically and normatively. Not 
only can we do so, we must do so whenever we go about 
reforming, say, our general education system. This is precisely 
how the last general education reform started out ten years ago—
with a summer study group that reviewed the great paradigms of 
liberal education, their contemporary critiques, and the emerging 
alternatives to them. Seeing liberal education as an intellectual 
tradition in its own right allows us—make that, forces us—to 
proceed reflectively whenever we think about the premises of 
general education as they are or should be. 
 
So, in preparation for this talk, I reviewed some founding 
documents of the intellectual tradition of liberal education, Anglo-
American branch. To my great surprise, I found the concept of 
‘cultural capital’ centrally embedded in them. The origin of liberal 
education, of course, goes back to classical Athens, but the modern 
Anglo-American branch stems from the defense of the educational 
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ideals and practices of Oxford University. Oxford’s educational 
philosophy came under attack after 1800 by adherents of a rising 
intellectual movement known as utilitarianism. The critics argued, 
in the words of one Sydney Smith, that, quote, “the only proper 
criterion of every branch of education” is, quote, “its utility in 
future life.” The utilitarians aimed to reorganize the educational 
system of England from top to bottom but, in the Oxford context, 
they meant to sweep away the study of the classical traditions of 
Athens and Rome, the study of rhetoric and eloquent speech, and 
the recitation of literary works. The space thus swept free would be 
filled in with curricula designed to provide individuals—then all 
male—with the knowledge they needed to practice law, medicine, 
architecture, and other specialized subjects. This, of course, is 
precisely what transpired in the second half of the 19th century, 
thanks to the development in Germany of the modern research 
university and its diffusion throughout the world. 
 
The defenders of liberal education began to confront the utilitarian 
challenge around 1810. One of the early defenders was one John 
Davison, a theologian and Oxford graduate. Davison put forth two 
theses that sound remarkably familiar two centuries later. First, 
quote, “A Liberal Education is something far higher, even in the 
scale of Utility, than what is commonly called a Useful 
Education.” In other words, a liberal education is supremely useful, 
not in providing immediately consumable information, but in 
developing what Davison calls ‘mental discipline’ and ‘the 
cultivated faculties’ of the mind, what we would call ‘higher-order 
reasoning’ today. And, second, a liberal education, quote, “is 
necessary … for the purposes even of that Professional Education 
which commonly engrosses the title of Useful.” As Davison 
explains, quote: 
  
A man who has been trained to think upon one subject, or 
for one subject only, will never be a good judge even in that 
one:  whereas the enlargement of his circle gives him both 
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knowledge and power in a rapidly increasing ratio… ideas 
act, not as solitary units, but by grouping and 
combination… Judgment lives as it were by comparison and 
discrimination. End quote. 
 
Confronting head-on the critics’ celebration of the allegedly 
‘presuppositionless’ observation of ‘facts’ just as they appear to 
the senses, Davison insisted on, quote, “much varied reading 
and discipline first, and observation afterwards.” One often 
hears that the ‘liberal’ in liberal education stems from the Latin 
word, liberalis, meaning ‘free.’ True enough, but the root of 
liberalis is liber, meaning ‘book.’ Free persons are people of 
the book. Observation is a great thing, but like judgment, it 
lives by comparison and discrimination. The observations we 
value most are those that confirm, advance, split, or vanquish 
intellectual traditions.  
 
Writing 1811, Davison seemed to foresee the relationship between 
liberal and professional education as we understand it today. A 
liberal arts education of quality saturates the environment with 
knowledge, with intellectual debates, and with alternative 
perspectives—firstly through the careful reading of texts, and 
secondly through observation informed by the discipline of a 
theory or research paradigm. It insists that the learner not 
specialize prematurely or concentrate too narrowly on information 
presumably relevant to one’s career after college, lest one find 
oneself lacking the capacity to grow and continue learning as 
today’s information becomes obsolete. A liberal education, 
moreover, alerts students to the interconnections between fields of 
knowledge—their “grouping and combination,” as Davison put 
it—and to the types of discerning judgment attendant to them. 




Finally, such an education empowers the individual. In our time 
empowering the individual becomes its foremost justification. As 
Davison put it in 1811, a liberal education, quote,  
 
gives [a person] strength in any subject he chooses to 
grapple with, and enables him to seize the strong point in 
it… [It] describes the power that every one desires to 
possess when he comes to act in a profession, or elsewhere; 
and corresponds with our best idea of a cultivated mind. End 
quote. 
 
There you have it, the beginnings of our branch of a hallowed 
intellectual tradition, replete with arguments and contrasts that are 
still current 200 years later:  general vs specialized knowledge, 
anti-utilitarianism, empowerment of the individual, the value of the 
book, the cultivation of the ability to compare and discriminate, the 
emphasis on judgment, the recognition of the ineluctable 
interdependence between fields of knowledge, the appreciation for 
serendipitous discovery that comes from reaching out beyond the 
premises of one field into the premises of another, and an 
understanding of the university as a place that enlarges one’s 
‘circle’ and thus allows “knowledge and power [to grow] in a 
rapidly increasing ratio.” 
 
Well, not quite. Davison’s understanding of liberal education was 
very different from ours. The Oxford education he defended 
required the student to study Greek and Latin grammar, literature, 
and oratory for four years along with single required courses in 
logic, elementary mathematics, ethics, natural philosophy, and 
metaphysics. By a liberal education today we mean something 
quite different:  a set of courses, hopefully well-selected, that 
complements the specialized major. Our present GNED system 
recognizes that the only intellectual tradition that most students 
truly come to inhabit is the one embedded in their major. Even the 
small liberal arts college lives in the shadow of the research 
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university. There is a clear upside to this situation:  In order to 
engage an intellectual tradition, you need to immerse yourself in it. 
You need to surrender to its premises before you can even begin to 
see its limitations. Only in the major do you get that kind of 
exposure. The downside occurs when professional education 
becomes so prescriptive that students are denied the opportunity to 
explore intellectual traditions gatekeepers consider ‘extraneous’ to 
the field. This sells students short, and never more so than today, 
when fields of study multiply and divide so rapidly. Sociologist of 
science Diane Crane identified 8530 separate fields of study in a 
paper published 18 years ago. Who knows how many exist 18 
years later or how many justify themselves solely on grounds of 
utility? But if Davison was right, as I think he was, that, quote, a 
“[person] who has been trained to think upon one subject, or for 
one subject only, will never be a good judge even in that one,” then 
a liberal education has never been so important as it is today.  
  
So, it is time to deliver the goods. What, specifically, do courses in 
the Intellectual Traditions category contribute to a liberal education 
here at Illinois Wesleyan, given the world we live in today? 
 
A concern for theory and intellectual history is hardly foreign to 
courses in Natural Science issues, the Analysis of Values, 
Literature, Cultural and Historical Change, and other categories of 
GNED. But something special happens when ideas are fore-
grounded, juxtaposed, contrasted, scrutinized for their intellectual 
antecedents, and evaluated for their productivity, elegance, or 
evidential support—We see human reason at work in the 
construction of systems of knowledge. We see the wondrous 
capacity of human reason, fallible and faulty as it is, to organize 
experience into categories, to organize data into inductive and 
deductive systems of theory, to elevate exemplary achievements in 
discovery, interpretation, and explanation into paradigms, to 
organize theories and paradigms into intellectual traditions, and to 
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find trends, patterns, and epochs in the relationships between the 
components of intellectual traditions.  
 
To study intellectual traditions at this level is to relive the ancient 
Greek experience of wonder—wonder at the mysterious, 
authorizing force of Logos. This, I believe, is what Davison and the 
defenders of Oxford University wanted us to preserve from the 
original, Athenian model of liberal education. For us today, the 
apotheosis of Logos is impossible, even in the ceremonial context 
of Honors Day. Where the study of intellectual traditions should 
lead you, dear honors students, when you reach this moment of 
wonder, is right back into such specialized fields of inquiry as 
cognitive psychology, semiotics, and axiology, the study of the 
principles of valuation.  
 
With 50 courses listed in the GNED Handbook under category of 
Intellectual Traditions, liberal education is alive and well on this 
campus. Collectively, these 50 courses comprise a virtual 
encyclopedia of cultural capital. Even better, they provide students 
with the methodologies they need to critically evaluate intellectual 
traditions and their component paradigms, and perhaps even to 
attempt the partial unification of one or two of them—something 
made more likely, rather than less, by the growth of 
interdisciplinary fields of study and the phenomenon of the double 
major. Nothing, however, would foster our liberal arts mission 
more than to enhance the portion of our curriculum devoted to 
Intellectual Traditions. Students can help by taking second or third 
courses in the IT category as electives. Faculty who teach in the 
area could consider proposing a minor in Intellectual Traditions, or 
at least get together to talk about ways to elevate intellectual 
discourse on campus. All of us could do a better job of 
remembering that the root of liberalis is liber, ‘book.’ 
 
I should reiterate the points I wished to make this morning, but I 
am imposing on the time allotted to next year’s teacher of the year. 
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So, let me close with a brief story that encapsulates most of what I 
wanted to say. This is part of the homily I promised at the top of 
my talk. 
 
Alfred Schutz died prematurely in 1959. Seven years later, in a 
volume of commemorative essays, his good friend Eric Vogoelin 
recalled their long intellectual dialogue, which ended only with 
Schutz’s death. “But did it end?,” Vogoelin asked. “Nearly four 
decades of shared thinking and mutual criticism do not merely 
leave traces in one’s work—they also leave a habitual inclination, 
to ask oneself during this ongoing work, what the other would have 
had to say about it. One of the finest philosophical thinkers of our 
times is still the silent partner of my thinking.” 
 
That, ultimately, is the aim of the courses taught here in the 
category of Intellectual Traditions—to give you a number of ‘silent 
partners’ to take with you when you leave your alma mater. Thank 
you. 
